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SUFISM, MYSTICISM, STRUCTURALISM: A DIALOGUE 
T. Izutsu and H. Landolt* 
T. Izutsu: Well, since it is rather a formal occasion, I would like 
to say formally- "Welcome to Japan". 
H. Landolt: Thank you, Professor Izutsu. 
T.I.: You are my dear old friend, who happens to be one of the 
leading authorities on Sufism in Europe today and it is my 
special privilege and of course great pleasure to have this 
occasion to interview you. But not only will it be my personal 
pleasure alone, there are at present many young intellectuals 
in Japan who, as you may have observed, are getting interested 
in this kind of thing and it will be a good chance for them 
to learn from you. Now, whenever I think of you in your 
absence, the word which com~s to my mind is, strangely, 
Structuralism. For how many years by the way have we been 
friends with each other? 
H.L.: I think some twenty years. 
T.I.: Twenty years! As I recall, it was indeed twenty years ago 
when we were together in snow-covered Montreal, that you 
introduced me to the splendid world of Levi-Strauss, urging 
me to read his Pensee Sauvage. It was my first encounter 
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with Levi-Strauss. I found his thought-world at first very 
strange and difficult to understand but it had a very queer 
charm for me. I felt myself dragged into that world 
immediately and since then I have never left the kind of 
thinking he represents. For your initiation I am greatly grateful 
to you. Since that time I have followed the development of 
Structuralism to the point that I am now facing 
post-Structuralism. Now in connection with this very 
interesting situation, the first question I will ask you Is: in 
what sense, in what way is Structuralism connected with 
your special field? I think you are almost unique among the 
Islamicists with regard to the intense interest you have 
entertained in Structuralism. How does Structuralism come 
into your studies? 
H.L.: Well, Professor Izutsu, I shall first of all return your very 
kind compliments and at the same time make it very clear 
that I don't deserve the ones you just expressed. I remember 
those days in snow-covered Montreal with deep gratitude, 
and I am so happy to have this opportunity to be again with 
you - this time in your own country of the rising Sun! As 
far as your question about Structuralism is concerned, perhaps 
I should say at the outset that it was not directly my interest 
in mysticism that led me to Levi-Strauss. While I was studying 
Islamics, I was also studying Ethnology and it was from that 
angle that I was drawn towards Structuralism as a scientific 
method of investigation, as opposed to the more historicist 
trend that had been prevalent particularly in German 
anthropology. I was not so much interested in why a certain 
culture would have developed or by what historical process 
it would have been influenced to become what it was but 
rather what was behind the culture as such, what were the 
inner forces that kept any culture together to form a whole. 
Maybe one can see a certain connection between this interest 
and the interest in mysticism, for no doubt mysticism - one 
of the many definitions of mysticism that one can give -
has to do precisely with the "inner forces" that keep the world 
together, as it were. Since the time we met - I was actually 
just fresh from University at that time and I was still very 
much under the influence of Levi-Strauss and in the meantime 
contrary to you, I have not really followed post-Levi-Strauss 
developments except marginally. I became a bit critical of 
Levi-Strauss particularly as applied to the study of mysticism 
which I tried to do myself. 
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T.I.: That is a very interesting point for me. Why have you become 
a little bit critical of Levi-Strauss when you tried to apply 
it to Islamic mysticism? 
H.L.: Well, I think there are a number of reasons to that - one 
I would think is that I perceived it as too rigid a formalism , 
reducing every phenomenon, to almost mathematical, abstract 
elements supposed to be basic. Levi-strauss also says himself 
that what he wants is to establish a science, almost , I think, 
in the sense of natural science. Although Levi-Strauss of 
course has always been searching, since his Elementary 
Structures of Kinship, what is between nature and culture, 
I have the feeling that in the end he reduces the spiritual 
- qualitative - element in culture to an almost mechanistic 
-quantitative- one. 
T.I.: So you are no longer interested in him -you say? 
H.L.: That was one reason. The other reason of course is the influence 
of Henry Corbin, who is also perhaps a kind of structuralist 
in a sense, that is to say that he is entirely opposed to 
historicism, but he himself calls himself a phenomenologist 
rather than a structuralist. I think this means looking more 
at what one might call the "vertical dimension". From the 
point of view of Corbin, Levi-strauss's structuralism is 
reductionism, reducing phenomena to the purely phenomenal, 
purely horizontal dimension, and actually refusing to recognise 
such a "vertical dimension". 
T.I.: I agree. Whenever we try to apply the structuralist method, 
particularly such as has been developed by Levi-Strauss, we 
are sure to get into that kind of difficulty, no doubt. rn spite 
of all that, I am grateful to you for having introduced me 
to his work, for, by coming into touch with that particular 
thought trend, I have acquired a kind of particular sense of 
direction in the labyrinthian world of contemporary scholarship. 
I am not particularly interested in directly applying 
structuralism to Islamic studies - it's impossible and it's 
ridiculous - but following the development of structuralism 
up to post-structuralism has given me a keen sense of what 
the contemporary world is in need of, in whatever field of 
study it may be. As you know, Islamicists are mostly 
phHologists, primarily at least. There are of course exceptions 
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like Corbin and others, but many remain till the end 
philologists, and as philologists, they are not interested in 
Levi-Strauss, Structuralism, Derrida, and the like. But 
philology, on reflection, turns out to be a kind of text reading. 
In Islamic phHology as a matter of fact, we have to read 
at least classical texts written in Arabic and Persian. The 
problem that naturally arises is: what is ~ and how we 
should approach a given ~· In dealing with these problems, 
Structuralism proves to be very much relevant to our study, 
particularly the post-structuralist approach. But let us go 
back to our main topic, Sufism as Islamic mysticism. Do 
you agree to translating Sufism as "Islamic mysticism?" 
H.L.: Well, as far as translation can go. I think no translation of 
a technical term is really giving the full meaning; but it is 
convenient. 
T.I.: If it ever makes sense to use the expression Islamic mysticism 
in place of Sufism, if only for the sake of convenience, then 
by doing that we would be regarding Sufism as one of the 
various forms mysticism in general can assume. 
H.L.: This is actually a very difficult point. 
T.I.: Yes, I think so. 
H.L.: Because on the one hand Sufism, in the literal meaning of 
the term Sufism, that is to say ta§awwuf in Arabic, does 
not necessarily mean mysticism. It can simply refer to a 
historical movement of people called Sufis, originally ascetics, 
organised later in certain groups in different countries of 
the Islamic world. Sufism in this literal sense may be a 
pre-condition, or may include what we call mysticism, but 
a Sufi in that sense is not necessarily a mystic nor is any 
mystic in the world of Islam necessarily a Sufi in name. 
T.I.: Well, by saying that you are making yourself obliged to give 
some clarifications as to what you mean by mysticism. I do 
not ask you to "define" the word, for I know from the very 
beginning that it is futile and maybe a waste of time to try 
to "define" mysticism. In this kind of matter, definition 
necessarily means a stipulative definition; it is ridiculous, 
I know, to try to define a word like mysticism in a 
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non-stipulative way. But for the sake of our conversation 
we have to come to some primary understanding as to what 
is meant by mysticism, for only then shall we be able to decide 
whether Sufism is mysticism or not. So I would begin by asking 
you to tell me what you mean by the word mysticism. 
H.L.: Sufis themselves gave thousands of definitions. 
T.I.: Before going to Sufism, tell me what is the western concept 
of mysticism. 
H.L.: One can start with the etymology of the term whicl'l has 
something to do with mystery, the Greek mystery, something 
hidden, something secret, something presupposing initiation, 
not accessible at the outset to anyone. Such terms as the 
Arabic baJin come to kind at first when one thinks of what 
corresponds to what we call in the West, mysticism, that 
Is to say, bdtin, literally translated, the 11inner" as opposed 
to the "outer". That is to say the unseen, ghayb; in other 
words what we call a mystic would be someone who searches 
for the unseen - be that unseen now, the unseen meaning 
of a text - to come back to your question of how to approach 
text, or the unseen aspect of nature, or perhaps in the first 
place of oneself. 
T.I.: "Of oneself", yes, but not everything which is unseen can 
be a concern of mysticism. Can it be? 
H.L.: Well, I am not sure whether I understand your question. 
T.I.: You emphasise the concept of the unseen. You seem to be 
saying that mysticism is a search for the unseen in the most 
general sense. But my question is whether whatever is unseen 
can be a concern of mysticism. 
H.L.: No, it is not sufficient. 
T.I.: Then we shall have to narrow down a little bit the meaning 
of the "unseen11 , in talking about mysticism. 
H.L.: Well, the nature of the unseen so far as it interests the mystic, 
I would say, has something to do with being. In fact perhaps 
the very core of being. One of the questions Shabistari 
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(d. 7 40/1340), a famous Sufi mystic, raises in his poem is "Who 
am I?". Of course that question has been asked by philosophers 
as well and one might then ask what is the difference between 
philosophy and mysticism. Maybe it is not possible to clearly 
distinguish between certain kinds of philosophy and mysticism. 
So that's the answer. It depends on what philosophy we are 
talking of. 
1;.1.: If I am to define mysticism from the Buddhist point of view, 
I would say that it consists in existential realisation of the 
ultimate truth of being, then, following that, man's realisation 
of his own being, of his own self. If this provisional definition 
is correct then it would include praxis and theory. Praxis 
is absolutely necessary for spiritual discipline. 
H.L.: Yes, I was coming to that. But I was avoiding the term 
"ultimate truth" because I am not sure if we use it whether 
we are not already in a way distorting it because we objectify 
it by saying "ultimate". We have a certain concept of the 
ultimate which may not in fact be adequate. 
T.I.: Yes, of course, you are quite right. But I would point out 
at the same time that, as Derrida says, as long as we use 
language we can't get out of "logocentric" metaphysics! 
H.L.: That's why mystics actually prefer silence! 
T.I. So, when I say "ultimate", I don't mean ultimate in the literal 
sense, when I say truth I am not saying that truth does exist 
somewhere as an objective entity. As long as we use human 
language we have to have recourse to this kind of verbal 
reification. Well, you said that you were just going into the 
praxis aspect of mysticism. 
H.L.: Yes and I think that is the second answer to the question 
-how can we distinguish philosophy from mysticism- although 
certain philosophies of course call for action, praxis, as well. 
I think mysticism is not just, as many Western analysts believe, 
~ so-called experience, that is to say the so-called ultimate 
mystical experience. To make mysticism a pure matter of 
psychology is a kind of reductionism as well . Mysticism is 
a way, a way leading perhaps to certain forms of what may 
be called mystical experience, but most of it is praxis, stepping 
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from one stone to the next, under the guidance of a master; 
and I think this fact, that it is normally found, that it is 
undertaken, under the guidance of a master is extremely 
important; this differentiates it also from pure science. 
T.I.: And maybe from philosophy as well. There are many different 
forms of praxis that have come down to us: dhyana, Buddhistic 
meditation, Hellenistic theoria, Arabic dhikr, etc. The Indian 
counterpart of dhikr may be the utterance of the sacred word 
Om. These and other different methods of meditative praxis 
seem to aim at something essentially the same. 
H.L.: At something that might be called transformation of 
consciousness. 
T.I.: Exactly. Could you elaborate on what you call transformation 
of consciousness? How can our consciousness be transformed 
and into what? 
H.L.: I think part of it consists of losing part of one's day-to-day 
consciousness and gaining another kind of consciousness. 
T.I.: In connection with what you have called the unseen, invisible? 
H.L.: Yes. 
T.I.: That would imply that if that dimension of consciousness 
is opened up then what has been invisible to the ordinary 
consciousness will in a certain sense become visible. 
H.L.: Yes, or audible or in some way realised. 
T.I.: So, if that aspect of being becomes visible, audible, or more 
generally, perceptible, then on that very basis philosophisation 
can begin. I think the main difference between ordinary 
philosophy and a particular kind of philosophy which is based 
on mysticism lies exactly in that - that is to say, the latter 
kind of philosophy owes its very existence to a philosophisation 
of what one experiences in the face of the ordinarily invisible, 
be it gnosis, vijn8na, or !tikmat. 
H.L.: Yes, I would fully agree. 
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T.I.: rt is clear, then, that we share at least some rough ideas 
as to what kind of thing mysticism is. If, understanding the 
word mysticism in that sense, we agree that Sufism is a kind 
of mysticism, the next question that naturally arises is: what 
are the characteristics· of the [slamic variety of mysticism. 
From among many different forms of mysticism, what in 
your view characterises the Islamic one? 
H.L.: I don't know but what comes first to mind is of course related 
to the Islamic religion, which means a monotheistic religion, 
with a very heavy emphasis on the notion of will. 
T.I.: Can we start by making a basic distinction 
monotheistic mysticism and non-monotheistic, or 
a-theistic mysticism for the sake of convenience? 
H.L.: That would probably be important to begin with. 
between 
rather 
T.I.: In terms of this distinction, Islam is of course monotheistic. 
H.L.: Is monotheistic and located, if you can say so, in not only 
monotheistic but prophetic religion, which pre-supposes a 
prescribed way of life as laid down by the Prophet and his 
followers. So the mystic faces a situation where what we 
referred to before as the ultimate truth, or in other words 
God, as the religious would call it, is perceived as the unique 
distant source of the prescribed way of life; and especially 
in Sunni Islam, where there is no intermediary between man 
and God, the only way to approach Him according to the 
official version of Islam being to obey the divine Law. 
Whereas the mystsic actually wants to approach this ultimate 
truth not just by obeying the Law, but by understanding, coming 
closer to it, in the end perhaps being similar or identical 
in a certain sense; an approach which seems to be very difficult 
to reconcile with the official version, and that is why mysticism 
has always had a certain flavour of suspicion in Islam among 
the orthodox. It is a tragedy that gives it a very particular 
cultural flavour which I think is less a problem if you go further 
East. 
T.I.: Do you mean Far East? 
H.L.: I would even include India. 
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T.I.: Oh yes, of course. 
H.L.: But it is the same problem in Judaism and in Christianity 
to an extent. 
T.I.: Exactly the same problems are involved in these three religions, 
because of what Derrida calls logocentrism: Allah or God. 
But, as you have just said, Sufism differs from ordinary 
Orthodox Islam. 
H.L.: Yes,. in that it finds, shall we say, a minor tradition. If the 
Shan'ah, the Law, is the major tradition then Sufism has 
its minor tradition, called raMqah, which is the Path, which 
is theoretically conceived o as being implicit in the Shan'ah, 
or being its "secret". And then the third stage distinguished 
by traditional Sufism is .{faqfqah (the Truth). But I think there 
are other characteristics which are perhaps of a more positive 
nature than what we have said so far. 
T.I.: Yes. 
H.L.: Perhaps the very same monotheism also suggests the concept 
of a person, and it may be for this reason, as many others 
have already pointed out, that mysticism of, shall we say, 
the West, and that includes Islam, emphasises the personal 
nature of the ultimate, whereas if we go further east, of 
course, we have more an "it" mysticism rather than a "he" 
or "she" mysticism. 
T.I.: That's right. At that point, I think, the problem of Bayazid 
Bastami (d.261/875 or earlier) most cogently comes in. 
H.L.: Which is indeed very reminiscent of Indian mysticism. 
T .I.: From my own point of view, I would distinguish between two 
types of mystical experience in Sufism. One of them is -
well, it is commonsense - what is usually referred to by 
the term unio mystica, which I think is rather problematic, 
I mean this terminology; but we somehow understand what 
is meant. This is the mysticism of love. I mention this 
particularly because from our Buddhist point of view, this 
is a very strange form of man's relationship with the Absolute. 
Not only strange, but inconceivable. How can man become 
enamoured of God and how can there be a love affair between 
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man and God? But in fact this is the representative form 
of mysticism in Islam. Another type is what is sometimes 
called deificatio, self-deification, transforming man into 
something of a divine nature, as typically exemplified by 
Bas1ami, and maybe I;lallaj (d.309/922). Since, however, you 
happen to be far more qonversant than I am in these matters, 
I would like to take advantage of this occasion and learn 
from you. Tell me something about love mysticism in Islam. 
H.L.: To tell the truth, love mysticism is somewhat of a problem 
to me, too. But as one of my Sufi friends would say, it is 
because I do not really understand, that is to say, because 
I am trying to analyse with my intellect, and traditionally 
intellect and love are two opposed elements in man. Love 
is precisely the only way to overcome this intellect which 
always tries to analyse and therefore precludes what we might 
call the possibility of the unitive state of the mind. So love 
as an antidote to being overpowered by the intellect is one 
way of explaining it. But there are of course many stages 
of love as distinguished by Sufis. Just as there are stages 
of intellection, there are stages of love. So love experienced 
in the profane sense is not the same as love experienced in 
the mystic sense, although the former is often seen as a 
necessary first stage. In other words, they would say you 
can't really come to the truth if you have not experienced 
in this world a so-called profane love experience because 
it is what takes you out of yourself. lt involves the whole 
person. It's a minor, first stage of what is referred to as 
ecstasy, wajd; and perhaps mysticism, in general, to add to 
our many definitions, has something to do with the phenomenon 
of ecstasy anyway. 
T.I.: Yes of course, but the difference between the phenomenon 
of ecstasy and love mysticism consists in that the latter is 
essentially an "1-thou" relationship which is carried to the 
extreme limit of the elimination of the very distinction between 
"I" and "thou" when the so-called "transforming fusion" takes 
place. 
H.L.: I think the "transforming fusion" experience is more typical 
of Christian mysticism than of Sufism, although it may be 
found in tfallaj - at least in Massignon's interpretation, which 
stresses fhat aspect. More typical of classical Sufism is the 
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overpowering experience of divine will, against which the · 
human "partner" becomes a mere shadow (as in Junayd) 
(d.297/ 910). Or the experience of the moth being burnt in 
the light to which it is attracted. Later on, we have, for 
example, with Simnani (d. 736/1336), a real dialectic of an 
I-thou relationship, which culminates however, through several 
stages of challenge and response, question and answer between 
the two partners, in an elimination of the tension in pure 
mirromess. And in Ibn 'Arabi (d.638/1240), each love experience 
ultimately reflects in its own way an intra-divine tension: 
divine contemplation of itself. 
T.I.: In your opinion, then, love mysticism will ultimately be 
identical with self-deification. 
H.L.: Yes, ultimately. 
T.I.: Depends upon how we define the deificatio, but in any case, 
they almost come to the same thing. 
H.L.: Yes, I think so. 
T.I.: Would you say that, frankly speaking, ''love" is a dissimulated 
deificatio? 
H.L.: I wouldn't put it that strongly. But I would say that I would 
hesitate to establish a real typological difference between 
love mysticism and deification mysticism. 
T.I.: I was led to this distinction because in Hinduism, love mysticism 
plays an extremely delicate and interesting role, although 
Buddhism takes the position that there is absolutely no place 
for love, that anything like 'ishq and magabba is utterly 
inconceivable in the world of Nothingness. As for Hinduism, 
the religious consciousness started with Brahman, you know, 
as the impersonal Absolute. As long as we remain in this 
dimension of thought, there can be no personal love between 
Man and Brahman, for Brahman is strictly impersonal. As 
history goes on, however, we observe the Hindu mind gradually 
developing an idea of "personal god" until it becomes inclined 
to raise the personal God even beyond the impersonal Absolute. 
According to the older view, there could be absolutely nothing 
beyond the impersonal Absolute, but already in the Upani~adic 
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period, the M~qaka Upani~d, and particularly Svetasvatar.a 
Upani~ad, we see clearly an image of a personal god emerging 
graduilly and putting himself beyond Brahman as Purushottama, 
the "highest Person", or the absolutely supreme Lord, so much 
so that in the Bhagavad etta this personal God reigns supreme, 
and in the eleventh century it culminates in the bhakti 
movement of Ramanuja and of course in Tantrism ; In Tantrism, 
love as you know, turns into a sexual experience and love 
ecstasy is almost literally sexual ecstasy. In the case of 
Ramanuja, it's not sexual but it is bhakti, passionate love, 
loving adoration. Ramanuja also talks about man's identifying 
himself with Brahman. But according to him , it is only the 
first step in the Way, somewhat like Junayd in Islam. Becoming 
Brahman simply means a complete purification of man. It 
is a kind of preparatory stage, what comes next is approaching 
God and finally - if possible - going into God and this 
constitutes a kind of love mysticism, Bhakti mysticism involving 
a very interesting and very complicated process. In the case 
of §ankara, too, there is Lord, God, but God is, in his case, 
the first evolute or the first emanation of Brahman, and as 
such it occupies but a second place after Brahm an. Brahman 
is the suprefTie and god is the next, somewhat like Ibn al-'Arabi, 
in which the One is supreme and Allah comes only at the 
second stage. Love mysticism raises in this way an extremely 
interesting problem in comparative mysticism. In the case 
of Islam, if we take into consideration a man like Bayazid 
Bastami, we are also confronted with a very complicated 
situation, I think. How would you describe Bayazid Bastami's 
m%tici~ ? ) 
H.L.: Maybe the experience of the void. He has some very interesting 
accounts of his own experience - at least, well it is not his 
own words, but as purported by tradition - in which he 
distinguishes between several stages, each of which is a further 
step into nothingness, which he identifies with tawlftd., the 
Islamic idea of the One, eliminating in the process everything 
else. 
T.I.: Do you think tawgld in this context means becoming one? 
H.L.: Yes. I am not sure even there whether we can call it a process 
of deification. It's rather a process of elimination of everything 
- all veils that are between the subject and the object including 
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T.I.: 
the veil of thinking that there is a veil. But he never says 
what this last absolute behind the last veil is, so I would not 
call it deification. I would call it the experience of the void. 
I see. But the problem is whether we can exhaust Bastami's 
mysticism with the experience of the void. Last night in 
preparation for this conversation, I was reading again the 
shata~at of Bastami. I came across many sayings of Bastami 
or attributed to Bastami indicating something which I would 
describe as deification, such as ana huwa "I am he"; "I am 
thou", or more monistically "I am I", etc. In one case he says, 
"I am not I, I am I, or indeed I am he, I am He." The "glory 
to me!" is a famous one. 
H.L.: "How excellent is my state!" -
T.I.: When I compare these expressions with the Upani~adic 
expressions describing the Yogi 's Brahman-experience, I must 
come to the conclusion that if we are to describe his Sufism 
in one word, the best word will be deificatio, for "I am he" 
is exactly Upani~adic aham asmi. No less significant are 
expressions such as aham Brahma'smi "I am Brahman", and 
the more famous one Tat tvam asi, which would correspond 
to Bas1ami's anta dhdka "thou are that". I won't directly connect 
these expressions with Upani~ads, as Zaehner did. I think 
it's not right to derive all fhese utterances directly from 
Upani~adic sources, but there is a structural resemblance 
there. There can be no doubt. Becoming-Brahman would be 
becoming-God in the case of Basfami, and in that sense the 
word deificatio or self-deifi cation has, I think, some meaning. 
H.L.: Except that I don't know what "deus" means in this case, 
for, if we use the word deificatio, this includes the word 
deus. 
T.I.: I do admit, it is a problematic term, but since it is often 
used, I used that word as a matter of convenience. If you 
have a better suggestion I would most gladly adopt it. 
H.L.: Hellmut Ritter uses the term "Ich-Erweitenmg". 
T.I.: But I think that is too wide, isn't it? 
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H.L.: It is also problematic, yes, because then we have to define 
what I is meant, what Ich is; so I think we agree basically 
as to what we mean, but we are not sure about the term to 
be used. 
T.I.: Yes. The final problem is: how are we to connect this aspect 
of his mysticism with what you said at the outset about 
nihilisation. 
H.L.: That nothing else remains, all that is not it, is eliminated 
in the end, that is all. As "God" says to Bastami in one of 
his sha.fa~Jat: Da' nafsak wa- ta'8Z (leave yourself and com e!). 
That's 8.1(. Also he is very critical of any objectification of 
Deus, for example, when he was asked what is the greatest 
name of God, he answered gubz, bread, which is even 
reminiscent of certain Zen stories. So I agree he is reminiscent 
of non-typical Islamic experience whatever we may call it, 
deification or something else. Of course, I do not like to use 
such terms as natural mysticism as opposed to theistic 
mysticism either, because that implies the dogmatic 
pre-suppositions of Zaehner whom you mentioned, and a number 
of other preconceived ideas. 
T.I.: The very fact that BasJami very often uses personal pronouns, 
I, he and thou, means t hat at the very beginning in any case, 
it is personal and not impersonal. 
H.L.: Yes, but I have the impression that even the thou is eliminated 
in the end. There is only some kind of I. 
T.I.: That is right, for at the final stage he says "I am I". In that 
case "I" means divine I, nothing else. The same I would say, 
applies to the famous ~allajian expression Ana'l-!faqq. 
H.L.: Yes, one would think so, although Massignon has a different 
interpretation. Well his interpretation, I think, is very much 
influenced by his Christian background. He thinks that ~allaj 
means really a kind of love consumption between I and thou, 
between God and man, a kind of incarnation experience as 
prefigured by Christ and, of course, the external facts of 
5Iallaj's life may have induced him to think that way. But 
the traditional int erpretation in Islam of ~allaj is not qui te 
so "Christian". It is closer to Bas%ami. But coming back to 
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the difference between impersonal and personal mysticism 
and which one comes first, so to speak, you mention that 
in India certain schools consider the impersonal experience 
as the ultimate, but preceded by a personal experience, while 
other schools, the other way around. 
T.I.: Well, it is not exactly schools but the Upani§adic tradition 
itself, changing gradually from the impersonal Brahman to 
personal God. 
H.L.: But in the case of Saitkara, the impersonal experience is the 
ultimate, somewhat like Ibn' Arabi. 
T.I.: Yes. 
H.L.: Now I think in Islam what is perhaps best comparable to this 
is the distinction between wa~at al-wujUd on the one hand, 
of course represented by Ibn 'Arabi and his school, and on 
the other hand what is referred to as wa~at al-shuhUd. 
T.I.: Could you expand on that? 
H.L.: Wa¢at al-wujD.d literally, "unity of being" or "unity of 
existence", "oneness of the vertical dimension of existence", 
one might say. Some would prefer to call it transcendental 
oneness, I am not so sure about that term. But it certainly 
is an option. 
T.I.: Yes, but it depends upon how we understand the word 
transcendental. 
H.L.: Exactly. Wa¢at al-shuhUd, or "unity of contemplative 
experience" on the other hand, likes to insist on a certain 
twoness rather than a oneness, although the two ultimate 
ones reflect each other like an image is reflected in a mirror. 
There still exists a shadow of duality, considered in fact to 
be superior to waj)dat al-wujr1d, by such Sufis as 'Ala'uddaulah 
Simnani; he claims to have gone through the stage of wa~at 
al-wujr1d, in the sense of being completely identical with 
anything in nature, only to arrive later, at a higher stage 
in his view, to an experience of personal mirror identity with 
the ultimate person. So he comes back to the person. 
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T.I.: That is quite natural, from the Islamic point of view, I think 
he is completely right as long as he wants to remain a Muslim. 
H.L.: Yes of course, that is true; but on the other hand, we have 
in Islam also mystics who considered themselves as Muslims 
and who go so far as even considering an experience of absolute 
space as the highest. There is one mystic whom I have in 
mind here, a contemporary of Ibn 'Arabi, by the name of 
Ma/;lmud-i Ushnuhi, who has written a treatise on several 
different kinds of space, from dense space to a medium kind 
of space to absolutely subtle space, in which everything may 
happen simultaneously, so to speak. This is of course a rough 
way of putting it. And he identifies this most subtle space 
with the absolute. So we find on the one hand, certainly typical 
for the general pattern of Islam , the concept that personal 
mysticism is higher but it pre-supposes (with Simnani) a passage 
through impersonal mysticism, while on the other hand, even 
in Islam, inspite of its "personalist" pre-suppositions, we find 
also quite radical expressions of the other idea that personal 
mysticism, experience of a personal approach is fine but 
it is not the ultimate. The ultimate is impersonal presence 
in empty "subtle space". 
T.I.: That is extremely interesting from the Buddhist point of 
view anyway, because in Buddhism that which was in Hinduism 
Brahman becomes Nothingness, and the Brahman-experience 
becomes Nothingness-experience. Nothingness or Emptiness, 
but in a very particular sense somewhat like Ushnuhi's concept 
of space. 
H.L.: It is at the same time fullness. 
T.I.: Unfortunately, I have not studied Ushnuhi and I have no clear 
idea as to what kind of thinker he was, but what you have 
just said is quite enough to give me a clear idea of him. 
H.L.: He was probably influenced by 'Aynulquzat-i Hamadani 
(d.525/1131) about whom you yourself have written many 
important articles and who of course also was perhaps a 
precursor, in a sense, of Ibn 'Arabi. 
T.I.: Bas1ami's case represents a very bold and daring movement 
in the properly Islamic context, and many people have tried 
to save him; I think one of them was Junayd, the most 
important one. 
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H.L.: He actually criticized him. 
T.I.: Yes, criticized him, but I think he did not criticize him away 
as a heretic. 
H.L.: No. He just said that he is a little bit immature. 
T.I.: Or mad. 
H.L.: Imperfect. 
T.I.: But it may have been just a pretext. 
H.L.: In order to save him from the wrath . 
T.I.: Yes. As a matter of fact, I have a question about Bastami. 
In spite of his daring adventures he was not persecuted as 
seriously as many other mystics who were less daring. I have 
not seen any record of his having suffered from an orthodox 
Inquisition, although, it is true, he was exiled several times 
from Bastam. But he was not in danger of his life, was he? 
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H.L.: No comparison to ~allaj. Yes, this is a very interesting 
question, especially for historians. I suppose that one answer 
to that question would be that he did not live in Baghdad, 
not in the capital of the Muslim caliphate. He lived in the 
province of Khorasan, where It might have been easier to 
say certain things which were not for all ears. More 
importantly, perhaps, Sfallaj travelled and propagated - he 
was actually a missionary - and felt it was his duty to convince 
everybody else of his kind of ideas, while Bastami preferred 
secrecy, lived very much in seclusion and had only a few 
disciples around himself. 
T.I.: Well, how would you describe Junayd's position? 
H.L.: Well, Junayd was basically by training a jurist, a faqlh and 
an intellectual of mysticism. He is perhaps the first to 
formulate several stages of mystical experiences in terms 
understandable to the Muslim intellectual of that time. Whether 
or not he was in doing so influenced also by translations of 
Greek philosophy, which had occurred at about the same 
time, or a bit before, I don't know. His vocabulary does not 
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seem to allow such a conclusion. It's Quranic and traditional 
Islamic vocabulary; but on the other hand, of course the 
translations were there and I think it is a mistake to assume 
that only what we find in our texts has existed. 
T.I.: Well, I asked you that particular question because I don't 
understand why he is considered so great. I don't see in him 
any particular mark of greatness. He may be orthodox and 
a very pious Muslim with some training in mysticism, but 
as a mystic he is not at all original. That is my impression. 
If I am wrong, correct me. 
H.L.: No, I do not think you are wrong! He is - that is why I called 
him an intellectual of mysticism - he tried to formulate 
in a way understandable, - in fact it is not, even in his 
formulation, easily understandable - but he tries to formulate 
experience, to classify several stages of taw9fd, which 
certainly distinguishes him from an ordinary Muslim. He tries 
to show the way how the mystic proceeds through several 
stages; from ordinary profession of faith - "there is only 
one God" - to the idea that this One is the ground of your 
being. Actually, he uses the formula, in speaking about this 
experience, not anta dh8ka like BasJami, not "thou art that", 
but "as you were before you came into being", which is a 
rather interesting idea, this idea of the mhh8q (Covenant) 
as it is religiously expressed. But on the whole, I would go 
along with you, he is certainly far from being as at tractive 
as someone like ijallaj or Bastami, or Ibn 'Arabi or 'Aynulquzat, 
and even Simnani in spite .)of his somewhat shan'at-minded 
approach. 
T.I.: Well, we started this conversation with Structuralism or 
Levi-Strauss. It will be very proper for us to bring to an end 
our conversation with post-structuralism such as is represented 
by Derrida. I regard him, Derrida, as an avant-garde of the 
contemporary thought trend, and his key term - although 
he does not like the term "key term" - "deconstruction" 
(deconstruction) is intended to be a fierce fight against what 
he calls logocentrism. Now both these concepts, deconstruction 
and logocentrism, are extremely interesting in understanding 
mysticism and religion in general. In a certain sense I would 
say mysticism, in general, is a deconstruction movement 
within a religious context. Hence the grave danger it involves 
Religious Traditions 19 
for both itself and orthodoxy. As for Buddhism, since it doesn't 
know of any God, deconstruction raises no problem; everything 
goes as smoothly as anything. From the very beginning 
Mahayana Buddhism was, so to speak, deconstructed. 
H.L.: I was going to say, you may not need it. 
T.I.: Although in the course of Mahayana Buddhism's history, there 
appeared several times logocentric trends, on the whole it 
was non-logocentric, and in that sense one may say it was 
deconstructed from the very beginning. Of all the great world 
religions, Buddhism represents the unique case in which 
deconstruction raises no problem. In Islam, Judaism, and 
Christianity, on the contrary, which are conspicuously 
logocentric in that they are based on a belief in the absolute 
personal God, deconstruction easily falls into blasphemy, 
and in the case of Islam many Sufis died actually for this 
particular reason. Bas1am.i in this respect is a remarkable 
exception. For, as we have said, Bas1ami came out unhurt 
from the hands of orthodox jurists. But m fact, I think, BasJami 
was representative of a kind of intransigent deconstruction 
within the confines of Islamic mysticism. Perhaps Junayd can 
be regarded as representing a reaction against that. Do you 
agree? 
H.L.: I am not sure. 
T.I.: I am not sure, either. But he seems to have resisted Islam 
being deconstructed by this kind of "mad" movement. 
H.L.: I would say that would probably apply to Simnani, later on. 
He was trying to save Islam as he understood it. That is why 
he criticized Ibn 'Arabi. Nevertheless, deconstruction 
understood in its widest sense certainly also applies to Islamic 
mysticism, in the sense that we have the notion of fana, 
"annihilation"- or whatever translation one might want 
to choose for this term; it literally means "disappearance". 
T.I.: Disappearance of subjective consciousnes to begin with, then 
the objective world. 
H.L.: Yes, and the objective world as well. 
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T.I.: A total annihilation of the world of being. 
H.L.: But it's not the whole story. Fano' is always followed (perhaps 
with the exception of Bastami), is supposed to be followed 
by its correlative baqd, which means literally permanence, 
staying, or roughly translated "being" as opposed to "non-being". 
So just as the Islamic formula of dhikr (and part of the 
profession of faith) Ld ilGha illa'llah contains two basic aspects, 
negation and affirmation, which two-fold rhythm is being 
implanted into the mytic's consciousness by repetition in 
dhikr, so also his experience reflects the two-fold experience 
of, shall we say, deconstruction and construction. Construction 
is of course on another level. The mystic is coming back to 
the world, so to speak, constructing it again. Ibn 'Arabi calls 
this new construction the "second separation" (farq thdni). 
T.I.: I completely agree with you, but I would also point out that 
Buddhism itself is like that. The whole thing does not end 
with annihilation; after annihilation, everything is to come 
back again, totally transformed. 
H.L.: Absolutely. But then I would perhaps ask you where is the 
second part in Derrida's case? 
T.I.: In Derrida's case, if we, in Derridean fashion, deconstruct 
all logos or eidos experienceable in the world, then we cannot 
but find ourselves in a world of the play of signs. That is, 
I think, the gist of his idea of "play"; well, to tell the truth, 
it is mainly because of this idea that I am interested in his 
thought. You know, the deconstructed world as he describes 
it is a limitless flux; nothing rem ains fixed , solidly fixed; 
everything endlessly moves around. As an ontological 
experience, the realization of the fluidity of things as described 
by Derrida is most interesting to me, because it corresponds 
exactly to the Buddhist image of the world of being after 
annihilation. In Buddhism t oo, after annihilating everything, 
subject and object both, one comes back to the empirical 
world, and finds all things there again flouri shing, not solidly 
fixed, but constantly moving: an incessant play of things, 
or to use Derrida'a terminology, the perpetual play of signs. 
H.L.: But isn't that in a way, not very far from what Heraclitus 
already implied by saying "everything flows". As opposed 
to the more static view? 
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T.I.: Yes, that's right. It certainly echoes back to the ontological 
fluidity of Heraclitus as opposed to Parmenides. 
The Editor of Shis8: You have talked about structuralism vs. post-
structuralism, especially its latest phase, deconstruction, 
but in my view, your discussion hasn't led to the problem 
relating to language. If possible, could you please talk a little 
bit about Semiotics, as represented by Roland Barthes and 
Julia Kristeva, especially the distinction made by Kristeva 
between two types of signs: le symbolique and le semiotique. 
Professor Landolt does not seem to agree with Levi-Strauss 
with regard to his later theoretical development, especially 
his realism lacking in spirituality. But cannot we possibly 
regard Kristeva as having tried to reinstate spirituality under 
the name of semiotics, in the very process of the formation 
of signs. 
T.I.: Very interesting suggestion! But going into Semiotics in the 
present context would lead us too far afield. 
H.L.: Well, I am not very familiar with Semiotics, but I would simply 
say that it is a scientific method, like structuralism itself, 
and should therefore be distinguished from philosophy or 
mysticism. Like any science - even philology! - it can of 
course be useful for the study of mysticism. Semiotics in 
particular could be useful for a clearer understanding of the 
nature of mystic paradoxa, those "strange" shafa?;ldt about 
which we talked earlier, and their relationship to "ordinary" 
language. But I doubt that it can reproduce the inspiration 
of those paradoxa, just as I doubt that a scientific analysis 
of the brain can reproduce consciousness. 
T.I.: But in that sense the whole movement beginning with 
structuralism has nothing to do with mysticism, I should say. 
H.L.: No, I agree. 
T.I.: But the point is that we can re-interpret the mystical 
experience in terms of the concepts developed by those people. 
That's all. 
H.L.: Yes, and, in that sense, of course, the very fact that people 
like yourself are attracted to both would show that there 
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is something. There is potential in this kind of approach 
but it depends on who is doing it. 
T.I.: When the world of being is deconstructed, then we will have 
what we would call "signs", or "traces". In an ontologi cally 
deconstructed world, Derrida recognizes only "traces" of 
things, in place of the things themselves. 
H.L.: Which may mean anything! 
T.I.: The main point will be that in such a world there will no longer 
be any real things. In mystical terminology, we might describe 
the ontological situation by saying that everything is a dream, 
that we are all living in a dream world. From the very beginning 
the world was a dream and every thing, each single thing 
was a dream object but we were not aware of that. Through 
mysticism, we came to know that they were dreams. Derrida 
and those who are around him know, without going through 
mysticism, that things are ultimately drea,ms. But they do 
not say so; instead, they speak of "traces". No substances 
but only traces. 
H.L.: But isn't the trace always a trace of something. 
T.I.: Yes, of course, but that something is never graspable, never 
becomes fully "present". There is no eschaton. That's the 
point. No matter how far we may go in search of the "thing" 
itself, we can never reach it, we are always left with "traces". 
In semiotic terminology these "traces" are signs, and, or more 
strictly, "signifiants". So the world is full of "signifiants". 
It's a flux of signifiants. 
H.L.: It's very Islamic in a way. 
T.I.: In what sense? 
H.L.: Well the world is full of dydt, "signs", and you can't actually 
grasp the One who is Islamic terms made those signs. But 
I think there is still a difference, if Derrida doesn't have 
to go beyond - leaves it as that, so to speak. The mystic 
also considers the things as just signs, but it is because maybe 
he does not know, but he has confidence that somehow, 
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something is behind, which he will in one way or another 
grasp even if he cannot name it. 
T.I.: Maybe! A kind of Derridean eschatology! 
H.L.: That is very interesting indeed. 
T.I.: But eschatology in Derrida's VISIOn will never be fulfilled, 
never reach the point of actualization. 
H.L.: This is very interesting from a mystically Islamic point of 
view as well. 'Aziz-i Nasafi (d. ca. 700/1300), for example, 
insists that all we can distinguish is the "face of God", i.e., 
the "signs", and the "soul of God", i.e., existence, but no 
"essence" of God. Absolute anti-essentialism. Derrida's 
decontruction is also of course an anti-essentialism. 
T.I. : Yes, no doubt-
H.L.: But then, on the other hand, my critical question remains. 
If we find that two things are not 'A' does it necessarily follow 
that they are both 'B'? 
T.I.: What do you mean? 
H.L.: Let us say we have three things. If A is not B and C is not 
~. it still does not follow that A and C are equal. 
T.I.: What are you driving at? 
H.L.: That is to say, I am a bit skeptical in comparing two things 
of which we per.ceive first of all that they share in a negation. 
To give an example that is closer to my field, if we find Sufism 
and Ismailism to a certain extent negating the relevance 
of the Shan'ah, it does not necessarily follow that the two 
are the same. They may relativize its importance for diffe rent 
reasons. Or the "deconstruction" of peripatetic philosophy, 
the famous Tahafut al-Fazasifah of Ghazali (d.505 / llll), may 
have very different motivations from those which animated 
Suhrawardi (d.587/ 1191) to do the same thing in the first 
part of his f!ikmat al- lshroq. And therefore the deconstruction 
of the mystic and the deconstruction of Derrida may also 
be done for different reasons. 
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T.I.: Of course I agree. All I wanted to say is that by going through 
structuralism and coming to a post-structuralism culm inating 
in something like Derridean deconstruction, we may come 
to re-realise the contemporary relevance of many old things, 
including mysticism . 
H.L.: In that sense, of course, I also agree! 
